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Abstract
Using data on correction rates for vehicle recalls in the United States from 2007
to 2010, we investigate information transmission from manufacturers to owners re-
garding the defects of recalled vehicles. We pay special attention to the role of the
language manufacturers use to convey each recall's seriousness in the letters they
send to owners to explain the nature of the defects in their vehicles, and the possi-
ble consequences if the defects are not xed. We nd that recalls linked to riskier
defects, dened by the type of equipment aected in the vehicles, are associated
with higher correction rates. Interestingly, the content of recall notication letters
plays an important role in increasing correction rates because the letters convey
information to owners above and beyond baseline information about which part
of their vehicles can present problems. We also nd that, in a number of cases,
the language that manufacturers use to explain the risks to owners are worryingly
milder than the descriptions the National Highway Trac Safety Administration
(NHTSA) use, resulting in signicantly lower correction rates. We conclude that
information transmission to owners regarding recalls should be more clearly regu-
lated since the language aects drivers' likelihood of taking their cars to be xed.
We advocate that the NHTSA return to the pre-2001 practice of assigning hazard
levels to all recalls, and that the agency consider making sure manufacturers clearly
communicate recall rating information to vehicle owners. Our results indicate that
these practices would result in higher correction rates, remove faulty cars from the
roads, and, consequently, save lives.
Keywords: Safety Regulation, Vehicle Defects, Automobile Recalls, Transmission
of Information, Consumer Behavior
JEL Classi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1. Introduction
The number of automobile recalls in the United States has substantially increased over the last
two decades, and in 2012 alone, more than 17.8 million vehicles were recalled. Vehicle recalls
and safety are now drawing more public attention than ever, but, in spite of the increased public
concern about recalls, there has been few empirical studies on the relationship between recalls
and safety. Most studies discuss particular aspects of recalls, such as their eects on demand,
vehicle resale prices, rm valuation, liability verdicts, or recall initiation, but not safety.1 More
recently, Bae and Bentez-Silva (2011 & 2013) directly tackled the safety issue and found that
recalls are eective in reducing the number of accidents as well as injury severity. They also found
that vehicle models with recalls with higher correction rates have, on average, fewer accidents
in the years following a recall. They have concluded that recall regulation is \eective" in the
sense that removing defects reduces accident damage on the roads.2
The process that can make a recall campaign eective, requires active cooperation of all
related parties: regulators, vehicle manufacturers, and vehicle owners. The NHTSA requires that
vehicle manufacturers notify recalls to their customers via First-Class Mail so that vehicle owners
can take their vehicles to dealers. Then, dealers remove defects from the vehicles at no cost to
owners. Even if both regulators and manufacturers issue recalls in a timely manner, recalls will
not be eective if vehicle owners do not take their vehicles to dealers, because potentially risky
vehicles will still be on the road. Therefore, vehicle-owner eorts are essential to completing
successful recall campaigns. The corrective action can be measured by the correction rate, which
is the ratio of the total number of items inspected and remedied to the total number of items
involved in a recall.3 Therefore, raising the correction rate implies that the number of vehicles
with potential defects which are still on the road are reduced. Raising the correction rate from
the current average levels of around 70%, to a higher level would result in more \eective"
recall campaigns. Therefore, the NHTSA prioritizes working closely with manufacturers to raise
1These papers include Crafton, Hoer, and Reilly (1981), Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hartman
(1987), Huble and Arndt (1996), Marino (1997), Rupp and Taylor (2002), Rhee and Haunschild (2003),
and Bates et al. (2007).
2It is hard to conclude, however, that the regulation is \cost-eective" because a careful cost-benet
analysis would include valuing human lives and human suering and without detailed information on the
injuries and the characteristics of those involved in the accidents that exercise would be quite speculative.
3The total number of items inspected and remedied includes the total number inspected and not
requiring remedy.
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correction rates. However, it is not possible to raise the correction rate to 100 percent because
vehicle owner decisions depend on many factors, including personal preferences, constraints in
terms of time and resources, and the recall information available to them.4
Carefully using the detailed information in our data set, and paying special attention to
the role of letters sent to owners, we identify the factors that aect the likelihood of owners
choosing to respond to recalls. We are the rst researchers to analyze the letters sent to vehicle
owners, and we do so one by one for all the vehicle recalls we use in our estimation.5 We nd that
recalls with riskier defects are associated with higher correction rates, and that owners of certain
brands and newer year-models respond more actively to vehicle recalls. One of our key ndings
is that the language used in recall notication letters plays an important role in increasing
correction rates, even after controlling for a measure of hazardous defects.6 If the letter includes
alerting phrases or words, such as \death," then the corresponding recall's correction rate is
10% higher than letters without such phrases, and the relationship is statistically signicant.
We suggest that vehicle manufacturers initiate recalls as quickly as possible once serious defects
are found, and that recall notication letters contain more detailed information on risks so that
the owners can correctly evaluate them.
We also nd, in a number of cases, worrying disparities in the language the NHTSA uses on
its website to describe the consequences of certain defects and the language manufacturers use to
explain the very same defects to owners, eventhough in a majority of the cases no disparities are
observed. Our estimates show that the presence of these disparities is negatively correlated with
correction rates, indicating that the lack of appropriate language in the letters lowers correction
4Notice that some non-obvious factors can end up aecting the success of a recall campaign. For
instance, some large recalls may aect the correction rates of other recalls because of the publicity and
notoriety they receive, and indirectly aect the owners' perception of the risks of all recalls. We will also
try to control for this type of eects.
5Hoer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1994) also try to explain the factors that aect correction rates. Their
study found that owner response rates are higher for owners of American vehicles, newer vehicle models,
and vehicles with severe safety-related defects. However, their model specication is problematic since
there are plenty of variables that they do not include, biasing the coecients of interest, and they do
not take into account the role of the letters from manufacturers to owners in their analysis, which we
believe is key to understand how individuals assess risk and decide to act, and to understand the role of
the regulator to guide the dissemination of safety information to owners.
6Recall notication letters are also used in other industries, for example the medical devices industry
that depends on the FDA. As briey discussed by Homan (2013) the lack of regulation by the FDA of
those letters also opens the debate about their eectiveness and the proper way to disseminate information
about recalls to the public. Our empirical study can be considered a pioneer in the analysis of information
transmission about recalls.
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rates. We advocate for the NHTSA to return to their pre-2001 practice of giving all recalls a
hazard rating, and to consider requiring that manufacturers include this hazard rating in letters
to vehicle owners.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the process of
U.S. recall campaigns, and discusses owners' likelihood of responding to recalls and the potential
risks they face from not doing so. Section 3 discusses the recall data and the sample construction.
The estimation strategy, the econometric model, and the summary statistics of the data we use
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 discusses our estimation results. Concluding remarks and
a discussion of the policy implications of our work are presented in the nal section.
2. Vehicle Recalls, Correction Rates, and Information Transmis-
sion
2.1 The Recall Process and the Correction Rate
The recall system for motor vehicles in the United States was rst introduced in 1966 to improve
public safety by removing potentially harmful defects from cars sold in the U.S. Since then,
the NHTSA and manufacturers have issued more than 15,063 recalls, and the campaigns have
become more active in recent years.7 The entire recall process is quite lengthy.8 A recall is
issued by either the manufacturer or the NHTSA when a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
equipment (including tires) does not comply with a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard.
The recall is also issued when a safety-related defect is found in the vehicle or equipment.
Once the recall is issued, manufacturers report to the NHTSA the details of their action, and
the agency also reviews the recall notication letters, which are then mailed to owners of the
recalled vehicles.
For each recall, the NHTSA requests that the manufacturer reports its correction rate to
the agency for 6 quarters following the date the recall is issued. The correction rate is included
in the quarterly status report. Each report should include (1) The notication campaign number
7Between 2000 and 2009, manufacturers of motor vehicles and vehicle equipment conducted almost
6,300 recalls to address safety issues ranging from malfunctioning airbags to defective child safety seats
(GAO, 2011).
8For more details, see Bae and Bentez-Silva (2011 & 2013), and as an example the recent news about
a recall of 1.56 million vehicles by Chrysler of vehicles built in the mid-90s and early 00s, discussed in
Vellequette (2013).
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assigned by the NHTSA; (2) The date notication began and the date notication ended; (3)
The number of vehicles or items of equipment involved in the notication campaign; (4) The
number of vehicles and equipment items that have been inspected and repaired, and the number
of vehicles and equipment items inspected and determined not to need repair; and (5) The
number of vehicles or items of equipment determined to be unreachable for inspection due to
export, theft, scrapping, failure to receive notication, or other reasons Some manufacturers
send follow-up notications beyond the rst 18 months of a recall campaign even though the
NHTSA does not require them to do so.9 According to the Report to Congressional Requesters,
the average correction rate is about 70%.10 However, the correction rates vary within a range
of 0.1% and 99%.
There is a number of reasons why the correction rate is not likely to be 100%. First, not
all notication letters reach the vehicle owners. In particular, if the owners of recalled vehicles
changes or owner addresses change, then the letters cannot reach owners. Used car owners have
a higher probability of not receiving the letters. Second, some vehicle owners do not respond to
the letters even if they receive them. This is mainly because some owners may believe that the
defects might be minor, or they may consider the time-costs of xing the vehicles greater than
the benets of doing so.
One intuitive measure of the success of recall campaigns is the existence of a positive
relationship between the correction rate of a recall and the level of risk of the defects of the vehi-
cles in that campaign. If this relationship exists, we can conclude that there must be something
that conveys the information on risks from manufacturers to owners, or owners have other ways
of acquiring that information. There are three ways vehicle owners to obtain information about
the defects. The rst one is the recall notication letter. The second one is an announcement
through the NHTSA website. The last one is newspaper and online coverage of the campaign.
The rst method is formal and direct, while the second method cannot be eective unless vehicle
owners actively seek possible vehicle recalls from the NHTSA's website. The third method is
independent of manufacturers' decisions on recall announcements. The media deals only with
recalls that may attract public interest.11 In particular, if there are large recalls or recalls that
9GAO (2011).
10Data from 2000 and 2008 on passenger vehicles,(GAO, 2011).
11Hoer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1994) show that the correction rates are not associated with media cov-
erage. However, their conclusion does not show clear evidence because media coverage in their study is
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capture public attention, then vehicle owners in general may check to see if their own vehicles
are also subject to recalls, even if their vehicles are not related with the big recalls or the recalls
that are attracting public attention. This argument is tested in our paper. Therefore, the rst
method, the recall notication letter, most likely is the most important source of information
that leads to owners' corrective behavior. The problem is whether or not the letters accurately
reect the risks. There might be a gap between the actual risk level and the perceived risk level.
The perceived risk is the risk that vehicle owners evaluate for their recalled vehicles from various
sources, including the letters. If the risks are substantially dierent, then the correction rates
may not be proportional to the risk levels. If the perceived risk level is lower than the actual risk
level, then raising correction rates of certain recalls may not necessarily help reduce the number
of accidents, assuming that the defects with greater risk levels cause more serious accidents.12
2.2 Risks and Recall Notication Letters
Recalls can be split into two groups, hazardous and non-hazardous recalls.13 Hazardous recalls
may cause serious injuries or deaths if the defects cause accidents. Non-hazardous recalls are
the recalls with relatively lower hazardous defects. Hazardous recalls include problems with
wheels, vehicle speed control, engine and engine cooling, suspension, and steering. Around
60% of recalls used to receive the hazardous rating. Non-hazardous recalls include problems
with seat belts, power trains, exterior lighting, structure, body, windshields, service brakes,
equipment, and labels. Some non-hazardous recalls also include issues with steering, airbags and
fuel systems. However, the ratings were determined by careful investigation from the NHTSA
and manufacturers.
One problem with this rating is that there is no way for vehicle owners to know which
rating their recall ts. They do not know this for two main reasons: (1) Since 2001, the NHTSA
has stopped specifying hazardous or non-hazardous ratings for recalls. (2) The recall notication
letter does not include a rating. Therefore, vehicle owners should evaluate the risk level from
dened by whether a press release was reported by the Wall Street Journal, and their result correspond
to a pre-internet period.
12Bae and Bentez-Silva (2011) show that the correction rate is negatively associated with the number
of accidents. However, they do not analyze what drives correction rates, and do not study the role of the
notication letters.
13Risk in this context is probably better measure as a continuous variable, however, the NHTSA when
rating recalls in the past used 4 categories, A, B, C, and D. Nowadays, they do not even release this
information to the public.
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the type of equipment involved in the recall and from language in the notication letters, or
from other sources. In this case, the risks of a recall are perceived and evaluated by the owners.
Currently, the manufacturers of the recalled vehicles do not have to announce recalls through
the media, such as newspapers and news announcements, although they often are announced,
especially if they aect a large number of vehicles.
If manufacturers follow the guidelines from the NHTSA, the letter should describe the
safety defect of the recall and the consequences of the defect. The letter should also include an
evaluation of the risk, a description of what a vehicle owner can do to get the defect remedied,
a statement of precautions that the vehicle owner should take, if any, and the symptoms that
will occur before the defect is repaired. The letter must clearly say that vehicle owners do not
have to pay for the repair. The time costs of xing defects may also aect owners' decision
on whether they x or delay the decision to take their vehicles to the dealers. For instance,
there are two letters. One letter says, \The procedure will take approximately 30 minutes."
The other letter says \It will take a day, but due to service scheduling, your retailer (or dealer)
may require your vehicle for a longer period of time." The owners of the latter would tend to
respond less because of the time cost. Manufacturers should include repair time measured in
hours. However, this may not be a reasonable measure for consumers' time costs. Interestingly,
among the recalls in the data set we use, the recall notication letters for 23 recalls do not clearly
indicate repair time. Furthermore, even though the repair time is in the letter, it is dicult to
quantify the repair time costs because of additional expressions. Language like, \Repair times
will vary and depend on your dealer's appointment schedule," \Due to service scheduling, your
dealer may require your vehicle for a longer period of time," and \Plan to leave your vehicle with
the dealership to allow the dealer some exibility for scheduling your repairs," can cause serious
measurement errors. For our estimation, we will exclude this variable. In reality, the contents
of the letters are highly discretionary, which means that it is entirely up to the manufacturers
to determine how alarming the descriptions about risks and consequences are in the letter.
The risk levels are only explained in the letter's description of the defects. Therefore, the
descriptions that show urgent or high-risk defects include: \could lead to a re," \can increase
the risk of injury for smaller drivers in a frontal crash," \can result in a crash without prior
warning" or \could cause a crash resulting in injury or death." The use of words, like re, urgent,
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immediate, crash without warning, injury, or death, may indicate the relative seriousness of the
defects to vehicle owners. The lack of standardized language and ratings is clearly problematic,
especially because it leaves the decision transmitting a sense of urgency regarding vehicular
problems in the hands of manufacturers, the only ones who can benet from low correction
rates. This does not mean that manufacturers act necessarily in a malicious manner, in fact we
nd that in some cases the language they use is actually stronger than the one suggested by
the NHTSA, but they understand that the safety of a particular motor vehicle at a particular
point in time is a function of many variables, one of them the mechanical or technical issues
of the vehicle. As cost minimizers, and entities that want to maintain a reputation for quality,
they are the ones more likely to play down any issues that arise with their products unless the
regulators is willing to step in and further clarify the information that needs to be included in the
letters. We have created a set of variables to measure these discrepancies, and we will use them
in our estimation to uncover the possible eect of this dierence in information transmission on
correction rates.
3. Recall Data and Sample Construction
We use recall data from the NHTSA containing recalls occurring from 2007 to 2010. The NHTSA
updates recall data daily, and the data covers all recall campaigns from 1966 to the present.14
We do not include recalls from 2011 or later because most recalls are ongoing and some reports
have not yet been made.
Over the 4 years of study, 2,784 recalls were initiated. Table 1 shows summary statistics of
these recalls. The table shows that 2,408 recalls are vehicle recalls. Other types of recalls include
component, equipment and tire recalls. Their numbers are 33, 293, and 50, respectively. Thus,
more than 85% of recalls are vehicle recalls. Either the NHTSA or manufacturers can initiate
recalls, and manufacturers issue more than 70% of the vehicle recalls studied. The NHTSA's
Oce of Defects Investigation (ODI) and Oce of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) mandated
645 recalls. Regarding yearly recall issuance, the number of recalls increases in 2008, decreases in
2009, and increases again in 2010. However, the total number of vehicles involved has increased
14For the data set, see \http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/".
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since 2008. This implies that the recent recalls contain a much greater number of vehicles per
recall.15 Over the 4-year period we analyze, more than 61 million vehicles were recalled.
Table 2 shows the types of defects over the same period. The equipment recall is dominant
and it consists of 33% of all categories of defects. Other major types of defects include service
breaks, engine and engine cooling, steering, electrical systems, and fuel systems. The defects in
child seat belts are all included in the equipment recall category. There are only 62 tire recalls.
Among them, 12 recalls are included in the vehicle recall category.
Table 3 shows the number of vehicles included in these recalls. Sixty-four percent of the
recalls can be considered small ones, since they include 1,000 or fewer vehicles. In terms of
the number of vehicles, all these recalls add up to less than 1% of the total number of vehicles
included in all recalls. More than 500 recalls include between 1,000 and 10,000 vehicles, while
257 recalls include between 10,000 and 100,000. There are 114 recalls with more than 100,000
vehicles. However, these larger recalls cover 80% of the total number of vehicles involved in
all recalls over the four years studied. Furthermore, there are 11 mega recalls, which involve
21 million vehicles in total, so about 38% of the recalled vehicles come from these 11 recall
campaigns. Thus, the distribution of the number of vehicles per recall is extremely skewed.
From these recalls, we remove recalls that do not meet our research criteria and end up
with 178 recalls. The selection criteria are as follows.
First, we drop non-vehicle recalls from our data set. Most defective equipments and
tires are equipped across many vehicle models. Some tires are installed in dierent models
produced by dierent manufacturers. Therefore, the data from these recalls are not suitable for
the purpose of our analysis. Furthermore, a substantial portion of recall data on year models
are unknown, so we only include vehicle recalls, which drops 376 recalls from the data.
Second, we drop recalls with fewer than 1,000 units. There are 1,523 recalls in this
category, seemingly substantial. However, as we mentioned earlier, these recalls amount to
about 0.5% of the total number of recalled vehicles over the four years studied. Furthermore,
some recalls contain only, say, 10 vehicles. In this case, the correction rate is not very meaningful.
Some manufacturers locally produce their vehicles, so their correction rates may not correctly
15Toyota began to issue accelerator related recalls, beginning in the fall of 2009. The rst large-scale
recall issuance began on November 02, 2009 and 4.4 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles were recalled.
Since the Toyota recall concentrated the public attention, other recalls did not receive as much coverage,
but Ford also recalled its 4.5 million trucks that fall.
9
represent the whole population.16
Third, we also drop recalls involving current year-models because many vehicles are still
in the inventory of the dealers or being manufactured. These vehicles aect correction rates and
the resulting correction rates are not determined by owners' corrective behavior. Hoer, Pruitt,
and Reilly (1994) also drop these recalls because of the same reason. In our case this results in
dropping 409 recalls from the data.
Fourth, in the case that same defective parts or items are included across dierent types
of vehicles, we cannot use this data because we control for vehicle types. For instance, a recall
can be issued because of the defects in an item assembled in dierent vehicle-model categories,
that is, the same item is equipped in both trucks and compact cars. We remove these multi-
vehicle recalls because our estimation controls for vehicle types, but if a recall is issued for
vehicle models within the same category, then we include the recall. For example, suppose that
a defective item in a Ford recall is in both F-250 and F-350. Both types are trucks, so we include
the recall in the data set. Also, a few recalls were dropped because of incomplete data. Overall,
we drop another 298 recalls, leaving our estimation data set with 178 recalls.
In terms of the number of recalled vehicles, about 21.6% of the recalled vehicles are
included in the data set. Our exclusions might seem rigorous, but given the detailed information
we analyze for each recall, which requires reviewing by hand several documents of several pages
for each observation, it is understandable, we believe, that we can only keep the observations
that have complete, quality information.
4. Analysis and Estimation of Correction Rates
The data we use contain detailed information on each recall. Each recall also includes a variety of
recall-related documents, which we analyze one by one. We use Quarterly Performance Reports
to calculate the correction rates, which are then used as a dependent variable in our model. For
each recall, there are 6 correction rates.17 In our cross-sectional model, we use the fourth-quarter
16One alternative way to solve this problem is to calculate the weighted correction rate. This means
that we put more weight into the correction rate, according to the number of recalled vehicles included.
However, we have decided not to follow this possibility given the very small number of vehicles included
in this exclusion criteria.
17The correction rate is no longer available in the data set. Thus, we manually calculated them from
the quarterly reports.
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correction rate. Since there are 6 quarterly reports for each recall, we use them in a panel data
model to get a dynamic picture of the correction rates.
In terms of the specications we present, rst, we check to see if the recall campaigns we
analyze play an eective role in removing more serious defects from the road at a higher rate
(Model 1). If we nd that the correction rates are higher when recalls include more hazardous
defects, then we can conclude that the current recall campaign is eectively removing more seri-
ous defective items at a higher rate. To accomplish this, we include a variable, RISK, which, as
explained below, is a constructed variable as a function of the type of vehicle equipment aected
by the recall, using our knowledge about how the distinction between dierent types of recalls
was decided by the NHTSA years ago. This can be thought as a possible summary measure,
which if uncorrelated with correction rates would suggest a major failure of the recall system.
This specication does not investigate how this information is actually acquired by individuals,
even if we suspect that the main source of information is the letter sent by manufacturers which
includes the equipment aected by the recall. This is clearly a potentially noisy measure of
the actual risk to the owner since it is just a binary indicator and does not include the level
of seriousness of the defect, just which part of the vehicle is aected. Notice that we cannot
directly observe how or whether vehicle owners receive defect information, or how they form
their perception of the risk, but we suspect that a high proportion of those who receive the
letters will read them and at least check what kind of recall (which equipment is involved in the
recall) they are suppose to respond to.
This specication is directly comparable (up to some degree, given the dierent time
periods use and the fact that we include additional controls even in the simpler specication)
with the results presented in Hoer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1994). However, given our detailed
analysis of the data we can go much further than those authors and analyze if the kind of
equipment involved is all that matters or more information is extracted by individuals from the
information they acquire about the recalls, mainly through the letters.
Second, we test to see if the language in the recall letters sent by manufacturers can be
linked with owners' corrective actions instead or on top of the constructed measure of the risk
of the recall (Models 2 & 3). If the language in letters fully and correctly reects corresponding
risk levels and captures the same information as just the type of vehicle equipment aected,
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then it would not be necessary to include the constructed risk variable in the estimation model,
and it would suggest that the language in the letters is basically the only measure of information
that individuals process. The three specications follow.
[Model 1] yi = +1RISKi +X
0
2i3 +, i = 1; ::::; 178.




2i3+4DIFF MILDi+, i = 1; ::::; 178.




2i3+4DIFF MILDi+, i = 1; ::::; 178.
RISK is the dummy variable that indicates whether the recall is a hazardous recall. X2i are
other control variables that reect vehicle and manufacturer characteristics. We give RISK
the value 1 if a recall is a hazardous recall - associated with problems in wheels, vehicle speed
control, engine and engine cooling, suspension, or steering. Otherwise, it is a non-hazardous
recall. Since the information on hazard ratings is not directly available, we have followed the
practice in place up to 2001 when the ratings were published by the NHTSA. While some
misclassication is possible, we believe the variable represents well, on average, the overall risk
to the owners. Without identifying how the information on potential risks is conveyed to vehicle
owners, we can still test to see if the information is correctly conveyed in terms of aecting the
correction rates. Model 1 tries to accomplish the latter and get at the point of whether more
serious recalls do get xed more often.
Model 2 drops the constructed indicator of the seriousness of the recall, RISK, and
instead includes a vector of variables, X1i that try to measure the level of risk conveyed in the
recall notication letters, independent of whether the equipment involved already captures the
seriousness of the recall. If the risks are well-reected in the letter language, meaning there is a
strong correlation between the type of equipment involved and the way the letter conveys the risk
to the owners, then Model 2 would show very similar results to Model 1, with the new variables
playing the role of the constructed RISK variable, and with very similar estimates for the rest
of the variables of interest, and similar model t. We also include the DIFF MILD variable
as an additional control, trying to capture whether the discrepancy (in this case phrasing in a
milder way) between the language in the letters and the language in the NHTSA description of
the consequences of the faulty equipment, aects correction rates.
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Model 3 is then used to assess whether the information in the letters adds to information
on the constructed risk measure, suggesting that is not enough to know the type of equipment
involved but also whether there is a more serious issue involving that equipment. So we include
both types of information in the specications of Model 3, along as well to the measure of the
discrepancy in the language of the letters. If the dierent types of measures are statistically sig-
nicant, that will indicate that while the aected equipment matters, owners also pay attention
to information regarding the risk to them derived from the possible failure of that equipment.
Under this condition, and depending on how the estimated coecients change, we will be able
to understand the role played by each letter's language, which is very important because it is the
less regulated aspect of information transmission between manufacturers and owners. Suppose
that there are two recalls. One for engine defects and the other for windshields. Correction
rates for each recall would probably dier because of the dierent average risk levels associated
with defects in engines and windshields. We can probably expect the correction rate for the
engine defects to be higher. However, the language in the recall notication letters could add
information to convey how serious the recalls are, after controlling for the equipment type eect.
If that is the case, it suggests we should pay more attention to how information reaches owners.
4.1. Recall Notication Letters
To see the eects of the recall letter on the correction rate, we create four variables from each
of the letters in increasing level of seriousness of the consequences resulting from the faulty
equipment. They are CRASH, CR IN, CR IN DE, and DEATH. The rst variable, CRASH,
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the letters include the phrase, \Vehicle crash
without warning", otherwise, the value is zero. We use this variable to see if vehicle owners who
receive letters with this expression take, on average, higher corrective actions after reading the
letter with that phrase. This rst variable is the weakest criterion, so we expect it to have the
smallest eect on the correction rates. Next, the variable, CR IN, includes either \Results in
injury" or \Vehicle crash without warning," so it is a more serious risk to the owner, and we
expect a larger eect on correction rates. The third variable, CR IN DE, considers the cases in
which an additional word, \death," is added to the previous two phrases. Finally, the variable
DEATH includes those recalls in which the letters only include the word, \death." These are the
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key independent variables that try to capture the eects of the language included in the recall
notication letters. Notice that the phrases may not, however, reect actual risk levels correctly
because the language is used at each manufacturer's discretion. For instance, a letter for a very
risky recall may include only the word, \crash." Owners form their perceived risk by the letter,
so if the letter includes \death," and the variable is positively and signicantly associated with
the correction rate, then we can conclude that owners have internalized the warning correctly,
once we control for the objective baseline measure of risk of the recall.
We estimate both the second and the third models, using these four variables in succession
to see the eect of increasing the level of seriousness conveyed to the owners on correction rates,
with or without the control for the baseline eect of the type of equipment involved, and in all
cases including the measure of discrepancy, towards milder language, between the language in
the letters and the NHTSA report.
4.2. Other Control Variables
To control for vehicle and manufacturer characteristics, we include the following controls in our
specications:
(1) Dummy variables for the vehicle category - We divide vehicles according to the following
types: compact, sedan, SUV, truck, and motorcycle. Buses are included in the truck category.
If a recall is issued in more than one type, then we drop the recall in the data set because
it is not possible to control for the vehicle type. The car classications are from the Annual
Consumer Guide for Automobiles. Subcompact cars are in the category of compact cars. Both
midsize and large cars are included in sedan. Both minivans and buses are in the pickup truck
category. Two special groups of cars are sports and import luxury. We slightly modied this
classication so that sports cars are in either compact or sedans. We do not specify import
luxury, but luxury cars are controlled by another variable. One thing to note is that we include
motorcycles. Even though motorcycles are not included in passenger vehicle type categories, we
include them because many recalls are issued for motorcycles. The consumer guide classes are
somewhat closer to public perceptions, depending more on price and weight. (For more details,
see Ross and Wenzel, 2002)
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(2) Luxury vehicles - This is a dummy variable. A luxury vehicle is by denition more expensive
than other vehicles, and therefore, once a recall is issued, owners may respond to it more actively
than the owners of less expensive vehicles.
(3) Recreational vehicles - Recreational Vehicles (RV) are mainly included in the bus category.
However, we believe that owners of recreational vehicles may behave dierently, not respond
to recalls as quickly, and have lower correction rates, because these vehicles are mainly non-
commercial and not used on a daily basis.
(4) Foreign vs. Domestic - Nowadays, the distinction between domestic and foreign vehicles is
less clear because of frequent mergers and acquisitions and the presence of foreign manufacturer
plants in the United States. Foreign makers also have similar distribution channels to domestic
car makers. However, we still want to test to see if this aects corrective behavior.
(5) Vehicle's age - This variable measures how old the vehicle is at the time of the recall issuance.
To calculate this, we subtract the model year from the recall year. For instance, suppose that
a recall for 2007 Ford Mustang is issued on May 2010. Then, the value of the variable is three.
In many cases, recalls are issued for more than one-year models. In this case, we use the latest
year model as the model year.18 Owners of older vehicles may have a lower willingness to x
their vehicles, possibly because of the lower value of the vehicles themselves. Also, identifying
current mailing addresses for older vehicles is very dicult if there have been multiple changes
in ownership.19 To measure a possible non-linear relationship between the age variable and the
dependent variable, we also include the squared term of this variable.
(6) Unreachable Vehicles - Vehicle manufacturers should also report the number of the recall
notication letters that are not delivered to the owners. These unreachable letters do not aect
owners' corrective behavior. Therefore, we expect that the higher the ratio of the unreachable
18A possible way is to calculate the average model year, dened by the median value. However, doing
so does not alter the estimation results in any signicant way.
19The NHTSA has not conducted any formal analysis to conrm this. We believe that there are more
ownership changes, on average, for older vehicles.
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letters to the total letters is, the lower the correction rate is. There are many reasons why
owners may be unreachable. These reasons include vehicles being undelivered, exported, stolen,
or scrapped.20
(7) Big recalls - We observe if there was a big recall over a particular quarter. We dene the
big recall as recall involving more than one million vehicles. Recalling a million vehicles is not
common, so these recalls may have a greater probability of being covered in the media, and the
probability of vehicle owners seeing this piece of news will be higher. If these big recalls aect
correction rates, we can conclude that recall letters are not the only channel through which
owners receive recall information.
(8) Duration - This is the dierence between the date of owner notication and the date of the
rst quarterly report. Each quarterly report shows its correction rate collected until the last
date of each quarter, so this variable is very important to control for the dierence in the dates.
Suppose that a manufacturer noties vehicle owners of a recall on March. 1. Then, the rst
correction rate reects 30 days of corrective actions. Suppose that another recall's notication
date is March 31. Then, the correction rate would be zero for the quarter. We need to control
for this dierence in days. The longer the duration, the higher the rate is in a fairly mechanical
fashion.
(9) Manufacturers - Owners are heterogeneous in terms of their preferences on vehicle manufac-
turers. In order to control for this heterogeneity, we include manufacturer dummies.
4.3. Panel Data Model of Correction Rates
Each recall is announced at a particular time. Thus, all recalls begin their repair over dierent
time periods. Manufacturers should report their correction rates at least six times. Therefore,
the correction rates are dierent across dierent recalls as well as over time. To understand the
dynamic aspects of recalls, a panel data model can be used. We use a modied random trend
20Some manufacturers report the numbers in each category, while many other manufacturers just
report the total number of unreachable vehicles. Because of this data problem, we use the total numbers,
regardless the reasons.
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panel data model which can account for unobserved recall heterogeneity not correlated with the
other independent variables.
yit = ci + T
0
t g + 1xit +X
0
i2 + it
, where Tt = [t t
2 t3] and g = [g1 g2 g3]. The dependent variable, yit, is a correction rate of
a recall, i, at the quarter, t. Independent variables consist of three components.
The correction rate of a recall increases as time goes by. To control for a possible non-
linear trend, we use the polynomial terms. So if g^1 > 0, g^2 < 0, and g^3 > 0 and they are
statistically signicant, then we can conclude that the correction rates show a similar pattern over
time and they increase at a decreasing rate and then at an increasing rate. xit is a variable that
changes over time and across the observation. There is only one such variable, BIG RECALLit.
Then Xi is the vector of independent variables that do not change over time, which are basically
the variables that in the cross-sectional analysis where encompassed by the vectors X1 and X2,
which include all the language related variables in the letters, as well as the separate discrepancy
measure.
4.4. Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample
Table 4 shows summary statistics for observations included in our econometric models. The
total number of observations is 178. The dependent variable is the correction rate. Each recall
has 6 correction rates from 6 quarterly reports. The average correction rate for the rst quarter
is 21.21%, while the average for the last quarter is 59.05%. The NHTSA reports that the
overall average correction rate is about 70% in the fourth quarter. In our data set, it is 53.40%.
However, our data excludes the recalls with current year-models. Assuming that owners with
newer year models are more responsive to recalls, the relatively lower correction rates in our
data set should not be too surprising.
The average vehicle age is 2.78 years. The minimum age is 1 year and the oldest vehicles
are 14 years old. Note that the latest year-model is used for the variable when there are multiple
year models in a recall.
The variables for vehicle types are all dummy variables. In the data set, 12.15% of the
recalls involve compact cars, while sedans account for 18.23%. Trucks and motorcycles are 31.5%
and 13.81%, respectively. Recalls involving recreational vehicles account for only 5.52%.
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Slightly more than 50% of the recalls are issued for foreign vehicles. 58.43% of the recalls
are considered as hazardous recalls, and therefore 41.57% of the recalls are non-hazardous recalls.
This is the classication from the NHTSA linked to the type of equipment involved in the recall.
About 64% of the recall notication letters contain alerting words, such as \crash",
\injury", or \death", but only 10.67% of the letters contain the word, \death."
There are big recalls over the period of study. Over the 4 years (16 quarters), about 56%
of the recalls experience big recalls during the quarters when correction rates are reported.21
About 4% of letters do not reach the owners until the fourth quarter. Manufacturer Dummies
are also included to control for manufacturer-specic impacts on the correction rate. We include
manufacturers whose recalls consist of more than 3% in the sample.
Figure 2 shows the phrases on risks in the letters. Among the 178 recalls, 63 recalls
(about 35%) do not contain any urgent expressions in their notication letters. \Crash without
warning" is found in 24 letters. The words, \re" and \injury", are found in 43 and 26 letters,
respectively.22 The strongest word, \death", is found in 18 recalls. Thus, the variable, CRASH,
has the value of one in 24 in recalls and zero in 154 recalls. The variable, CR IN, has 90 ones and
88 zeros. The variable, CR IN DE, has 114 zeros and 64 ones. Finally, the variable, DEATH,
has 19 ones. Figure 3 shows these results.
Tables 5 presents the breakdown of our dependent variable, the correction rates, by the
key variables measuring the information ow between manufacturers and vehicle owners. First,
we see the breakdown of the correction rate measured by the constructed hazard recall variable.
As could be expected, recalls considered hazardous, given the type of equipment involved, have
higher correction rates (measured four quarters after the recall is issued). Notice, however, that
the ranges of values of the correction rate is quite high in all cases, but for the more hazardous
recalls both the minimum and maximum values are also higher. Then we present the cross-
tabulation of the correction rate variables with the four dierent types of language variables we
have constructed from the recall notication letters. We can observe here that the inclusion of
the word \crash" does not seem to correlate in a stronger fashion with higher correction rates; in
fact, on average, the correction rates are slightly lower than for recalls with letters which do not
21Some big recalls are issued at the end of a quarter, such as December. 29. In this case, we consider
the fourth quarter does not have big recall, but the rst quarter of the next year.
22An expression, \Electrical short", is found in one letter, but it often cause re. Thus these letters
are included in \Fire".
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include this word. The evidence does point in a much stronger fashion to a positive correlation
between the seriousness of the language used and the correction rates once we concentrate on the
three variables that reect stronger wording in the letters. The inclusion of the word \injury"
on top of crash is correlated with much higher correction rates, and the same happens with
the addition of the word \death." Also, the inclusion of only the word \death," even if not
mentioning the other words, is clearly correlated with higher correction rates. All this evidence
points in the direction of a correlation between the language used in the notication letters
and corrective behavior. However, so far this analysis is unconditional; we proceed to analyze
whether this evidence survives in a more careful conditional analysis that accounts for the other
variables that could explain corrective behavior by drivers of cars subject to recalls.
The table also shows the tabulation of the correction rate by the variables that try to
capture the discrepancies between the language used by manufacturers and the language used
by the NHTSA to describe the same recall. The variable DIFF MILD takes the value 1 when
we have found sizable language dierences between the letter released by the NHTSA about
a recall and the language used by the manufacturers in their letter to owners, which indicate
milder language in the letter by the manufacturers. We can see in the table that this variable is
correlated with considerably lower correction rates. We also show the variable DIFF STR which
takes the value 1 when the letter from the manufacturers contains stronger language than the
letter from the NHTSA. Interestingly, the latter is also correlated with lower correction rates in
this unconditional analysis.
5. Estimation Results
Table 6 presents the rst set of estimation results. Two models are presented. MODEL 1-1 does
not include manufacturer dummies, while MODEL 1-2 includes the dummies. The estimation
results show that the constructed hazard rating, RISK, is not associated with the correction
rate in the rst model for any level of standard statistical signicance. When the model includes
manufacturer dummies, the rating is estimated to aect the correction rate at the 10% condence
level. If a recall is hazardous, then the correction rate is 4.2% higher than the correction rate
of a non-hazardous recall. This result can be compared with the results in Hoer, Pruitt, and
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Reilly (1994), who estimated a similar model using data from 1984 to 1986. They nd that the
eect of the measure of severity is around 6.8%, considerably higher than our estimate. The
result should not be surprising given the fairly long list of omitted variables in their study, which
only included ve independent variables as opposed to our dozen of variables, not including the
manufacturer indicators. We have re-estimated our model trying to mimic Hoer, Pruitt, and
Reilly's specication and found a point estimate of 6%, fairly close, considering the more than
two decade dierence in the data used, and the dierence in the nature of the recalls studied.
This goes to show that the point estimate in that study was biased upwards compared with our
more detailed specication.
Our ndings indicate then that risk levels of defects in part determine owner decisions
to correct their defective cars. This means that, up to some level, the current recall system
seems to work, given that the riskiness of the defects inuences corrective actions. Given the
relatively small eect, and its marginal signicance, we can suspect that variables that capture
the additional details provided by the manufacturers regarding each recall could have an eect.
These details are provided in the recall notication letter, and the construction of the variables
requires a detailed manual reading of each notication letter, which can be up to 20 pages long.
We will analyze the eect of the additional information provided in the letters in the next tables.
If a recall is for a sedan, the correction rate is higher. The correction rate for motorcycle
owners is signicantly lower and it is statistically signicant at the 5% signicance level. This
may be because there are relatively more unreachable recall letters for motorcycle owners. Our
data set shows that the ratio of unreachable letters for motorcycles is much higher than the
ratio for other types of vehicles. The ratio for motorcycles is 5.41% on average, while the ratio
for non-motorcycles is 3.83%. However, this dierence is controlled by the variable UNREACH
in our model. Therefore, there must be other reasons why the correction rates are lower for
motorcycles. A possible explanation is that the share of expenditure on the motorcycle from the
owner's income is smaller than expenditure on other types of vehicles. Another explanation could
be that motorcycle owners are relatively risk averse. The same is true for owners of recreational
vehicles. The correction rate for recreation vehicles is nearly 25% lower than non-recreational
vehicles. The luxury vehicle owners respond to recalls at a higher rate.
The vehicle age is negatively associated with the correction rate and is statistically sig-
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nicant at the 1% level. If a vehicle is one year older, then the correction rate is 10% lower.
This has an important implication: Vehicle manufacturers should take recall actions as quickly
as possible, once a defect is found. Delaying recall decisions by a year results in a 10% decline in
correction rates. Therefore, the eect of recall regulation becomes smaller over time and leads
to more car accidents. Furthermore, the relationship is non-linear. Therefore, the older vehicle
models the owners have, the lower the correction rate is. However, the correction rate diminishes
at a decreasing rate. As we see the estimation results from this and in a later table, the vehicle
age eect is consistent over dierent model specications.
Both foreign and big recalls do not aect correction rates. When people take corrective
actions, big recalls are not a factor they consider.
As expected, the less the letters are able to reach the owners, the lower the correction
rates are. It is statistically signicant at the 5 to 10% levels. Therefore, in order to increase the
overall correction rates, both manufacturers and the NHTSA should try to nd ways to minimize
the number of unreachable letters. The coecient of the variable DURATION is statistically
signicant and has the expected positive sign. Vehicle dummies are included in the estimation
but do not appear in the table. The owners of certain manufacturers are more responsive to
recalls. We can interpret this as follows: Either some manufacturers manage the recall process
fairly well, or vehicle owners of these rms are dierent from those of other rms in dealing with
potential risks.
Notice that the t of the model is quite good (R2 around 47% once we introduce manu-
facturers' dummies) considering that we are estimating a cross-sectional model. The contrast is
quite stark compared to Hoer, Pruitt, and Reilly's (1994) low measure, which was only around
18%. The t is equally good or better in the rest of the specications we discuss below.
Table 7 shows the estimation results when we exclude the constructed hazard measure and
instead include four dierent independent variables representing the degree of seriousness of the
language in the letter.23 First, we use the weakest measure, CRASH. If the notication letter
contains the word, \crash", this does not aect the correction rate in a statistically signicant
way. Second, we consider recalls that include letters containing either the word \crash" or
\injury." The coecient is still not signicant and predicts a very similar eect to the previous
23While owners perceive risks dierently, since they receive the same recall notication letters, we can
estimate the average eect that particular language in the letters has on correction rates.
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measure. The third specication adds to the word \death" to \crash" or \injury", and it is
statistically signicant at the 10% level; the result predicts an eect of around 5.3%, considerably
higher than the previous cases. Therefore, when the letter includes relatively more alerting
expressions, the owner more actively takes corrective actions. Finally, when the letter only
includes the word \death," the correction rate of the corresponding recall is 10.9%. This implies
that owners take recalls more seriously when the letter explains the defects using stronger words,
such as \death." This provides us a policy implication: more detailed description on the risks
and all possible consequences from defects help increase the correction rate.
The coecients of other control variables (in particular those which are statistically sig-
nicant) are all what we expected and very similar to the previous estimation results, suggesting
that the measure we have omitted is not strongly collinear with those we have left in the model.
From this analysis, the recall notication letters seem to play an important role in raising the
correction rates, and individuals respond more signicantly to recalls which can lead to more
serious accidents.
Table 7 also includes the variable DIFF MILD, which takes the value 1 for the recalls
the letters of notication of which include milder language than the letter from the NHTSA
describing the particular recall. The sign of this coecient is negative, indicating that this
discrepancy reduces correction rates, and the size of the coecient is quite large and statistically
signicant, varying between 10% and almost 13%, depending on the specication. This eect is
quite large, and suggest that these discrepancies are an important issue that opens the discussion
of the kind of regulation that should try to prevent these discrepancies. As a sensitivity analysis,
we have also included (not shown) in the specications the variable that measures whether the
discrepancies indicate stronger language in the letters from manufacturers than in the description
of the NHTSA, but in that case the estimated coecient is very small, sometimes positive, and
not statistically signicant. Those results are available from the authors upon request.
Table 8 is similar to Table 7, except that now we also include RISK, the constructed
measure of how hazardous the recall is based on the type of equipment aected, in the model.
Interestingly, once we include this measure, the eect of the language indicators in the letters
becomes stronger, especially for the more serious warnings. This means that current recall
letters seem to contain additional information from owners' point of view, above and beyond
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the general importance of the recall, which aect their correction rates. Additionally, notice
that the point estimate of the RISK variable is very similar to what we estimated in Model
1-2, and it is very consistent across the dierent specications in the table. This suggests that
the warnings in the letters about the risks to the owners from a particular recall are capturing
an independent source of variation from the baseline eect of the type of equipment. Notice as
well that the rest of the coecients are also quite similar to the previous table, again suggesting
that all these measures belong in the specication and are identied in the model. In particular
the estimated eect of the variable that captures the worrying discrepancies in the language in
the letters, is still statistically signicant and the coecients are basically of the same size.
Table 9 is the estimation results from the (unbalanced) panel data model. The variable,
RISK, is statistically signicant at the 10% level, and we estimate only a slightly smaller eect
than in our cross-sectional model, suggesting that the recall specic individual component is
well captured by our independent variables. Notice, however, that the eects of the language
in the recall letters on the correction rates become somewhat weaker by around 1 percentage
point, suggesting a possible recall specic component aecting the particular language of the
letters.
The eect of the indicator of discrepancies between the reports of the NHTSA and the
language used in the letters are still mostly signicant (for the third model in the table the
coecient on the discrepancy is not signicant at the 10% level) but the size of the coecient
decreases across the board by around 3 percentage points, but still remains very sizable. We
estimate around an 8% decrease in correction rates in the presence of the discrepancies to-
wards milder reports by the manufacturers. If we include in this specication the variable that
indicates stronger language by manufacturers (not shown) the estimated coecient, as in the
cross-sectional analysis, is very close to zero, sometimes positive, and not statistically signi-
cant. Given that we have data for six quarters, we can estimate whether there is a signicant
time-trend. We nd that the correction rate starts to rise slowly in the rst place, and then
increases at an increasing rate as the time approaches to the nal quarter. All the coecients
that capture time eects are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Other independent variables
show very similar results to the cross sectional model.
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Using data on correction rates for vehicle recalls in the United States from 2007 to 2010, this
paper investigates information transmission from manufacturers to owners regarding the defects
of recalled vehicles. We nd that riskier recalls, measured using a constructed variable that
takes into account the equipment involved in the recall, are associated with higher correction
rates, and while the eect is statistically signicant, the magnitude is not very large; this result
is somewhat in line with previous literature using data from the 1980s. We also nd that owners
of certain vehicle brands and newer year-models respond more actively to vehicle recalls.
Using a careful, manual analysis of NHTSA documentation on each of the recalls we
analyze, we are also able to identify the eect of the particular language used in the notica-
tion letters on the correction rate. We nd that notication letters, through alerting language
used to describe the risk of not correcting the defect, play an important role in increasing the
correction rates, even after controlling for the constructed measure of hazardous defects. For
example, recalls, linked to letters that include the word \death" as a possible consequence of the
problems in the vehicle, have a correction rate nearly 11% higher than letters that do not include
\death". Since the way the recall risk is communicated to owners is currently unregulated and
left completely to the manufacturers to decide, our results have important policy implications.
In some cases, the letters do not contain enough information on the defects and remedies, even
though the defects may cause serious injuries or even death, and in a number of cases there are
discrepancies in the language used to describe the consequences of a recall between the NHTSA
and the manufacturers.
In our data, we nd, for example, that a European manufacturer issued a recall for a
given model in 2007 for vehicles with potential problems in the fuel system, so this has to be
considered a hazardous recall. Accordingly, the recall notication letter should have indicated
the detailed information on the defects and risks. However, the letter does not include any
possible consequences of the problem at hand. The document submitted and used by the NHTSA
mentions the defect's consequences using the phrase, \fuel leakage in the presence of an ignition
source could result in a re." However, the recall notication letter sent out to owners explains
the consequences using weaker language: \The fuel pump may become faulty, resulting in a
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strong fuel smell." Thus, unless owners of these vehicles visit the NHTSA website and actively
seek possible consequences of the problem the manufacturer describes, owners may think that
the defect is minor, and the correction rate could be lower than expected. Therefore, unless there
is a consistent way to convey risks to owners of recalled vehicles, there could be discrepancies
between actual and perceived risks. In another case, also with a European manufacturer, the
NHTSA alerts that a particular equipment malfunction can lead to problems in the fuel pump
that could create the \...potential for a crash resulting in injury or death." instead of using
this language, the manufacturer chooses to include the following in the letter: \Depending on
trac and road conditions, and the driver's reactions, this could increase the risk of a crash."
Clearly, the manufacturer includes milder language, and the absence of the NHTSA's keywords
is predicted to decrease correction rates signicantly. In fact, we nd that recalls that exhibit a
discrepancy that indicates milder language used in the notication letters, are estimated to lead
to signicantly lower correction rates of between 8% and 13%, depending on the specication.
Our results can be of potential relevance to other elds, since the use of notication letters
is also commonplace in other industries, like the medical devices industry regulated by the FDA.
In that setting the lack of regulation of these letters has also opened a discussion among experts
about how to better transmit information to owners of products subject to recalls.
Short of perfectly controlling the full content of letters, the NHTSA can return to its
pre-2001 policy of rating the recalls itself, and the agency could require that the manufacturers
include this rating in the letters to owners, in addition to the explanations the manufacturers
already include. Additionally, the NHTSA could mandate that manufacturers also include
information about the particular recall, like the number of accidents, complaints, people injured,
and people who have died in connection with the recalled defect. This additional information
would help owners accurately evaluate the potential danger of their vehicles. Notice that the
cost of adding this new information would not be substantial because both manufacturers and
the NHTSA have issued recalls based on this information. The information is already posted on
the NHTSA web site, but it would be more eective if this information appeared in the letters.
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Table 1. Recalls between 2007 and 2010
Variable Category Frequency Percent Variable Category Frequency Percent
Components 33 1.19 Vehicle 2007 586 24.34
Types of Equipments 293 10.52 Recalls 2008 682 28.32
Recall Tires 50 1.80 by Year 2009 492 20.43
Vehicles 2,408 86.49 2010 648 26.91
Total 2,784 100.00 Total 2,408 100.00
Initiation Manufacturer 1,763 73.21 Totaly 2007 14.82 24.07
ODI 604 25.08 Vehicles 2008 10.10 16.41
OVSC 41 1.70 Included 2009 16.57 26.92
2010 20.07 32.60
Total 2,408 100.00 Total 61.55 z 100.00
y Only vehicle recalls are included.
z Units used: one million vehicles.
Table 2 Types of Defects
Types of Defects Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Air Bags 55 1.98 53 2.20
Child Seat 34 1.22 2 .08
Electrical System 151 5.42 144 5.98
Engine and Engine Cooling 214 7.69 198 8.22
Equipment 920 33.05 801 33.26
Exterior (Interior) Lightening 132 4.74 91 3.78
Fuel System 142 5.10 130 5.40
Power Train 119 4.27 108 4.49
Seat Belts 103 3.70 92 3.82
Service Breaks 215 7.72 201 8.35
Steering 170 6.11 156 6.48
Structure 110 3.95 108 4.49
Suspension 114 4.09 96 3.99
Tires 62 2.23 12 .50
Vehicle Speed Control 30 1.08 29 1.20
Visibility, Windshields 66 2.37 60 2.49
Wheels 39 1.40 32 1.33
Other 110 3.95 95 3.95
Total 2,784 100.00 2,408 100.00
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Figure 1 Types of Defects




















Table 3. Potential Number of Units Aected
Numbers of Vehicles Recalls Average Units Total Units Percent Cum. Percent
1 - 1,000 1,523 202.31 308,116 .50 .50
1,001 - 10,000 505 3,449.16 1,741,826 2.83 3.33
10,001 - 100,000 257 34,992.05 8,992,956 14.61 17.94
100,001 - 1,000,000 103 265,913.10 27,389,045 44.50 62.44
More than 1,000,000 11 2,102,070.00 23,122,766 37.56 100.00
2,399 61,554,709 100.00 100.00
y There is no data on the units for 9 recalls.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
Correction Rate 1 175 .2121 .1797 0 .7636 RATE 1
Correction Rate 2 173 .3866 .1975 .0058 .9558 RATE 2
Correction Rate 3 178 .4763 .2069 .0177 .9762 RATE 3
Correction Rate 4 178 .5340 .2128 .0179 .9762 RATE 4
Correction Rate 5 178 .5658 .2121 .0181 .9895 RATE 5
Correction Rate 6 175 .5905 .2134 .0190 .9948 RATE 6
Independent Variables
Model Year 181 2005.66 2.3123 1993 2009 MODEL YEAR
Units Aected 181 73440.06 146786.8 1008 1128659 UNITS
Manufacturer Initiation 181 .6243 .4856 0 1 INITIATE
Vehicle Age 181 2.7790 1.9877 1 14 VEH AGE
Vehicle Age Squared 181 11.6519 19.1832 1 196 VEH AGE SQ
Compact 181 .1215 .3277 0 1 COMPACT
Sedan 181 .1823 .3872 0 1 SEDAN
SUV 181 .2431 .4301 0 1 SUV
Truck 181 .3149 .4658 0 1 TRUCK
Motor Cycle 181 .1381 .3460 0 1 MOTOR
Luxury Vehicle 181 .1381 .3460 0 1 LUXURY
Recreational Vehicle 181 .0552 .2291 0 1 RV
Foreign Vehicle 181 .5304 .5005 0 1 FOREIGN
Hazard Rating 178 .5843 .4942 0 1 RISK
Letter Crash Only 178 .1348 .3425 0 1 CRASH
Letter Crash or Injury 178 .5056 .5014 0 1 CR IN
Letter Crash, Injury, or Death 178 .6404 .4812 0 1 CR IN DE
Letter Death Only 178 .1067 .3097 0 1 DEATH
Letter with Milder Phrases 178 .0787 .2700 0 1 DIFF MILD
Letter with Stronger Phrases 178 .1236 .3300 0 1 DIFF STR
Letter with Phrase Changes 178 .2022 .4028 0 1 DIFF
Big Recalls 181 .5635 .4973 0 1 BIG RECALL
Duration 181 39.5083 40.9259 0 290 DURATION
Unreachable Letter 181 .0398 .0661 0 .5870 UNREACH
Manufacturer Dummy (Honda) 181 .0497 .2180 0 1 HONDA
Manufacturer Dummy (BMW) 181 .0387 .1934 0 1 BMW
Manufacturer Dummy (Volvo) 181 .0387 .1934 0 1 VOLVO
Manufacturer Dummy (Volkswagen) 181 .0277 .1643 0 1 VOLKSWAGEN
Manufacturer Dummy (Dodge) 181 .0442 .2061 0 1 DODGE
Manufacturer Dummy (Ford) 181 .0276 .1643 0 1 FORD
Manufacturer Dummy (Toyota) 181 .0442 .2061 0 1 TOYOTA
Manufacturer Dummy (Chevrolet) 181 .0387 .1934 0 1 CHEVROLET
Manufacturer Dummy (Nissan) 181 .0331 .1795 0 1 NISSAN
Manufacturer Dummy (Mitsubishi) 181 .0276 .1643 0 1 MITSUBISHI
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Figure 2. Description of Risk in the Letters: Estimation Sample






Crash w/o Prior Warning Death
Do Not Drive Fire
Injury None















Crash Only Crash/Injury Crash/Injury/Death Death Only
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
y Some letters include multiple expressions.
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Table 5. Correction Rates by Hazard Levels and Variables in the Letters
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
RISK = 1 104 .5624 .2131 .0257 .9762
RISK = 0 74 .4941 .2072 .0179 .9456
CRASH = 1 24 .5321 .2033 .1589 .7807
CRASH = 0 154 .5343 .2148 .0179 .9762
CR IN = 1 90 .5543 .2043 .0280 .9762
CR IN = 0 88 .5132 .2203 .0179 .8547
CR IN DE = 1 114 .5497 .2034 .0280 .9762
CR IN DE = 0 64 .5061 .2274 .0179 .8547
DEATH = 1 19 .5905 .1841 .2636 .9575
DEATH = 0 159 .5272 .2155 .0179 .9762
DIFF MILD = 1 14 .4555 .2882 .0256 .8547
DIFF MILD = 0 164 .5407 .2048 .0179 .9762
DIFF STR = 1 22 .4857 .1696 .2222 .8093
DIFF STR = 0 156 .5408 .2177 .0179 .9762
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Table 6. Determinants of Correction Rates without Letter Variables
MODEL 1-1 MODEL 1-2
Manufacturer Dummies No Yes
Constant .6979 (.0467)*** .6961 (.0517)***
RISK .0383 (.0249) .0424 (.0257)*
COMPACT .0217 (.0419) .0131 (.0439)
SEDAN .0831 (.0446)* .0868 (.0447)*
SUV .0529 (.0398) .0507 (.0409)
MOTORCYCLE -.1063 (.0479)** -.1375 (.0493)***
LUXURY .0753 (.0356)** .0629 (.0380)*
RV -.2490 (.0742)*** -.2429 (.0781)***
FOREIGN -.0269 (.0282) -.0437 (.0384)
VEH AGE -.1029 (.0145)*** -.0961 (.0158)***
VEH AGE SQ .0059 (.0012)*** .0055 (.0013)***
UNREACH -.3857 (.1817)** -.3399 (.1782)*
BIG RECALL .0180 (.0245) .0125 (.0253)
DURATION .0009 (.0003)*** .0006 (.0003)**
NUM of OBS 178 178
R2 .4355 .4719
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used.
*, **, *** : Signicant at the 10-, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level respectively.
Both BMW and Volkswagen are statistically signicant. These dummies are positively associated
with the correction rate.
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Table 7. Determinants of Correction Rates with Letter Variables
MODEL 2-1 MODEL 2-2 MODEL 2-3 MODEL 2-4
Expression CRASH CRASH or CRASH, INJURY DEATH
In the Letter Only INJURY or DEATH Only
Constant .7340 (.0516)*** .7119 (.0537)*** .6952 (.0521)*** .7022 (0.0514)***
RISK - - - -
CRASH .0287 (.0410) - - -
CR IN - .0295 (.0273) - -
CR IN DE - - .0530 (.0281)* -
DEATH - - - .1091 (.0572)*
DIFF MILD -.1289 (.0483)*** -.1152 (.0496)** -.1017 (.0486)** -.1177 (.0478)**
COMPACT -.0086 (.0421) -.0025 (.0417) -.0045 (.0433) .0092 (.0417)
SEDAN .0821 (.0438)* .0895 (.0423)** .0968 (.0433)** .0955 (.0427)**
SUV .0456 (.0394) .0475 (.0398) .0489 (.0390) .0556 (.0404)
MOTORCYCLE -.1377 (.0465)*** -.1333 (.0450)*** -.1338 (.0456)*** -.1561 (.0461)***
LUXURY .0725 (.0410)* .0753 (.0393)* .0691 (.0404)* .0747 (.0393)*
RV -.2495 (.0776)*** -.2472 (.0757)*** -.2305 (.0766)*** -.2324 (.0756)***
FOREIGN -.0361 (.0372) -.0433 (.0353) -.0405 (.0356) -.0387 (.0345)
VEH AGE -.1007 (.0165)*** -.0962 (.0156)*** -.0996 (.0156)*** -.0951 (.0153)***
VEH AGE SQ .0060 (.0013)*** .0056 (.0012)*** .0059 (.0012)*** .0057 (.0012)***
UNREACH -.4108 (.1780)** -.4157 (.1744)** -.4385 (.1729)** -.4100 (.1920)**
BIG RECALL .0122 (.0261) .0124 (.0263) .0127 (.0262) .0127 (.0256)
DURATION .0006 (.0003)** .0007 (.0003)** .0006 (.0003)** .0007 (.0003)**
NUM of OBS 178 178 178 178
R2 .4906 .4926 .4989 .5088
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is
used.
*, **, *** : Signicant at the 10-, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level respectively.
Manufacturer dummies are included in the estimation, but not reported in the table.
32
Table 8. Determinants of Correction Rates: Full Model
MODEL 3-1 MODEL 3-2 MODEL 3-3 MODEL 3-4
Expression CRASH CRASH or CRASH, INJURY DEATH
In the Letter Only INJURY or DEATH Only
Constant .7188 (.0521)*** .6979 (.0550)*** .6757 (.0547)*** .6853 (.0518)***
RISK .0465 (.0246)* .0431 (.0248)* .0480 (.0251)* .0473 (.0248)*
CRASH .0371 (.0397) - - -
CR IN - .0293 (.0271) - -
CR IN DE - - .0580 (.0290)** -
DEATH - - - .1136 (.0563)**
DIFF MILD -.1295 (.0486)*** -.1161 (.0502)** -.1000 (.0495)** -.1181 (.0484)**
COMPACT -.0064 (.0425) .0002 (.0420) -.0013 (.0437) .0128 (.0422)
SEDAN .0813 (.0438)* .0886 (.0427)** .0973 (.0435)** .0952 (.0431)**
SUV .0472 (.0401) .0489 (.0406) .0507 (.0397) .0576 (.0417)
MOTORCYCLE -.1481 (.0471)*** -.1426 (.0453)*** -.1439 (.0459)*** -.1671 (.0461)***
LUXURY .0655 (.0404) .0697 (.0386)* .0623 (.0398) .0685 (.0388)*
RV -.2352 (.0757)*** -.2355 (.0744)*** -.2152 (.0752)*** -.2186 (.0743)***
FOREIGN -.0448 (.0379) -.0521 (.0361) -.0505 (.0361) -.0484 (.0352)
VEH AGE -.1020 (.0163)*** -.0967 (.0154)*** -.1002 (.0155)*** -.0954 (.0151)***
VEH AGE SQ .0060 (.0012)*** .0056 (.0012)*** .0058 (.0012)*** .0056 (.0011)***
UNREACH -.3695 (.1783)** -.3755 (.1748)** -.3970 (.1722)** -.3661 (.1959)*
BIG RECALL .0065 (.0253) .0071 (.0254) .0068 (.0253) .0069 (.0246)
DURATION .0006 (.0003)* .0006 (.0003)** .0006 (.0003)* .0006 (.0003)**
NUM of OBS 178 178 178 178
R2 .5001 .5009 .5092 .5188
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is
used.
*, **, *** : Signicant at the 10-, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level respectively.
Manufacturer dummies are included in the estimation, but not reported in the table.
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Table 9. Random Trend Panel Data Model
MODEL 4-1 MODEL 4-2 MODEL 4-3 MODEL 4-4
Expression CRASH CRASH or CRASH, INJURY DEATH
In the Letter Only INJURY or DEATH Only
RISK .0411 (.0232)* .0390 (.0231)* .0418 (.0230)* .0420 (.0227)*
CRASH .0244 (.0341) - - -
CR IN - .0253 (.0238) - -
CR IN DE - - .0442 (.0258)* -
DEATH - - - .1054 (.0379)***
DIFF MILD -.0889 (.0413)** -.0773 (.0428)* -.0666 (.0432) -.0781 (.0406)*
COMPACT .0182 (.0434) .0222 (.0433) .0206 (.0431) .0349 (.0428)
SEDAN .0770 (.0419)* .0834 (.0422)** .0882 (.0421)** .0894 (.0412)**
SUV .0472 (.0333) .0486 (.0333) .0491 (.0332) .0565 (.0328)*
MOTORCYCLE -.1186 (.0431)*** -.1141 (.0430)*** -.1145 (.0428)*** -.1352 (.0426)***
LUXURY .0456 (.0439) .0486 (.0436) .0430 (.0435) .0473 (.0428)
RV -.2036 (.0519)*** -.2021 (.0518)*** -.1884 (.0525)*** -.1863 (.0510)***
FOREIGN -.0244 (.0348) -.0303 (.0347) -.0281 (.0344) -.0262 (.0339)
VEH AGE -.0812 (.0142)*** -.0773 (.0139)*** -.0798 (.0138)*** -.0757 (.0136)***
VEH AGE SQ .0044 (.0014)*** .0041 (.0014)*** .0043 (.0014)*** .0041 (.0013)***
UNREACH -.3735 (.1662)** -.3797 (.1661)** -.3993 (.1661)** -.3756 (.1625)**
BIG RECALL -.0015 (.0053) -.0015 (.0053) -.0014 (.0053) -.0015 (.0053)
DURATION .0010 (.0003)*** .0011 (.0003)*** .0010 (.0003)*** .0011 (.0003)***
TIME .3356 (.0240)*** .3356 (.0240)*** .3356 (.0240)*** .3355 (.0240)***
TIME SQ -.0640 (.0077)*** -.0640 (.0077)*** -.0640 (.0077)*** -.0640 (.0077)***
TIME 3 .0044 (.0007)*** .0044 (.0007)*** .0044 (.0007)*** .0044 (.0007)***
Num of Obs 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
Num of Group 181 181 181 181
R2: Within .7817 .7817 .7817 .7817
R2: Between .4861 .4880 .4935 .5075
R2: Overall .6004 .6017 .6051 .6132
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** : Signicant at the 10-, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level respectively.
Manufacturer dummies and a constant are included in the estimation, but not reported in the table.
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